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Who Benefits from Economic Development?- 
A Reexamination of Brazilian Growth 
in the 1960's 
BY GARY S. FIELDS* 
One of the most interesting and contro- 
versial cases of recent economic develop- 
ment is that of Brazil. Over the decade of 
the 1960's, Brazil achieved a substantial rate 
of growth by the standards of less devel- 
oped countries (LDC). For the latter years 
of the 1960's and the first part of the 1970's, 
growth rates approached 10 percent per 
annum. On this basis, the Brazilian case 
was widely heralded as an "economic 
miracle." 
More recently, however, two challenges 
have arisen. One group of analysts has 
looked with disfavor upon social policies 
which prevailed over the period, particu- 
larly following the rise to power in 1964 of 
the military government. A second group 
examined the distributional question of 
who received the benefits of this growth, 
found greater income inequality according 
to conventional measures, and concluded 
that the poor benefited very little if at all. 
These observations have caused many stu- 
dents of development to ask whether the 
high rate of aggregate growth in Brazil was 
worth the apparent social and distributional 
costs. The consequent debate, involving 
Albert Fishlow (1972, 1973a,b), Carlos 
Langoni (1972, 1975a,b), and Celso Furtado, 
among others, has been intense and often 
acrimonious, resulting in widespread dis- 
agreement about the desirability of taking 
Brazilian economic and social policies as a 
model for other developing countries to 
follow. 
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine 
one of these two challenges, namely, the 
distributional impact of Brazilian economic 
growth during the 1960's. My results lead 
to a quite different interpretation from 
the conventional one. I will show that the 
poor in Brazil did participate in the rapid 
economic growth of the decade. Estimates 
presented below indicate that average real 
incomes among families defined as poor by 
Brazilian standards increased by as much as 
60 percent while the comparable figure for 
nonpoor families is around 25 percent. 
However, since nonpoor families receive in- 
comes which are much greater than those of 
poor families, the bulk of the growth of na- 
tional income over the decade was received 
by families whose incomes placed them 
above the official poverty standard. Thus, it 
would be incorrect to say either that 1) in 
achieving a high rate of economic growth in 
Brazil the rich got absolutely richer while 
the poor got absolutely poorer, or 2) the in- 
comes of poor families increased more 
slowly (percentagewise) than those of non- 
poor families. These and other findings are 
presented below in Section II, and some of 
the reasons for the observed changes are 
discussed in Section III. 
In assessing the distributional conse- 
quences of Brazilian economic growth, this 
study explicitly adopts an absolute poverty 
approach. In so doing, it is at odds with the 
bulk of the economic development litera- 
ture, which while urging a poverty focus, 
has long relied on measures of relative in- 
come inequality and Lorenz curves. Thus, 
this paper does not merely offer "one more 
measure"; it is, rather, the use of a different 
type of measure that causes the divergent 
*Associate professor of economics, Yale University. 
An earlier draft of this paper was written while I was 
a visiting professor at the Centro de Estudios sobre 
Desarrollo Econ6mico, Universidad de Los Andes, 
Bogota, Colombia. Partial support for this research 
was received from the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development under RPO/284. How- 
ever, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect 
those of IBRD. I wish to thank the above institutions 
without implicating them. 
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TABLE I-BRAZILIAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND 
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, 1960 AND 1970 
A. Variable Income Brackets 
Monthly Income in Percentage Percentage Monthly Income in Percentage Percentage 
1960 NCr$C of Population of Income 1970 NCr$C of Population of Income 
None 14.7 0.0 None 11.7 0.0 
0-2.1 22.3 5.2 1-100 31.7 8.0 
2.1-3.3 14.4 7.0 101-150 12.8 6.2 
3.3-4.5 10.5 7.4 151-200 15.6 10.6 
4.5-6.0 13.1 12.3 201-250 4.5 3.9 
6.0-10.0 13.8 20.0 251-500 14.6 21.2 
10.0-20.0 8.2 22.2 501-1000 5.9 17.1 
20.0-50.0 2.6 16.4 1001-2000 2.2 13.0 
Over 50.0 0.5 9.4 2001 and over 1.0 20.1 
Mean (Current NCr$) 5.52 Mean (Current NCr$) 258.1 
Mean (1960 U.S. $ per year) 513 Mean (1960 U.S. $ per year) 679 
Gini Coefficient 0.59 Gini Coefficient 0.63 
B. Comparable Income Bracketsa Cumulative Percentage of 
Percentage of Population Population 
Monthly Income in - -- 
1960 NCr$C 1960 197 1960 197 
None 14.7 11.7 14.7 11.7 
0-2.1 22.3 23.8 37.0 35.5 
2.1-3.3 14.4 12.2 51.4 47.7 
3.3-4.5 10.5 11.0 61.9 58.6 
4.5-6.0 13.1 14.5 75.0 73.1 
6.0-10.0 13.8 9.4 88.8 82.5 
10.0-20.0 8.2 10.9 97.0 93.4 
20.0-50.0 2.6 5.0 99.6 98.4 
Over 50.0 0.5 1.6 100.1 100.0 
Source: Panel A, Albert Fishlow (1972), Tables I and 5. 
aCalculated from data in Panel A. 
bApproximations. 
CNCr$ (thousands). 
results. The paper concludes in Section IV 
by reviewing the principal findings and ex- 
ploring some further questions of more gen- 
eral applicability raised by the Brazilian 
debate. 
I. Basic Results and the Customary Interpretation 
The best known study of economic 
growth and changes in the size distribution 
of income in Brazil over the decade of the 
1960's is that of Fishlow (1972). The basic 
data are reported in Panel A of Table 1. 
Looking first at the level of income, the 
mean income among the economically ac- 
tive population in constant U.S. dollars in- 
creased from $513 in 1969 to $679 in 1970, a 
real increase of 32 percent.' 
At first glance, however, the data on in- 
come distribution seem to tell another 
story. We see that the upper 3.2 percent of 
the economically active population received 
27 percent of the income in 1960; by 1970, 
their share had risen to more than 32 per- 
cent. In addition, the Gini coefficient rose 
from 0.59 to 0.63, seemingly implying a less 
1This is the percentage increase of "uncorrected 
incomes" for the "total economically active popula- 
tion," the only comparison possible with Fishlow's 
data. 
572 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1977 
even income distribution. A second study of 
Brazilian growth over the same period, by 
Langoni (1972, 1975a), arrives at basically 
the same changes in the income distribu- 
tion.2 
In research on the distributional con- 
sequences of economic development, virtu- 
ally all studies to date have maintained 
(usually implicitly) that changes in eco- 
nomic well-being are positively related to 
changes in the level of national income and 
negatively related to changes in measured 
inequality in its distribution, using such 
measures as the Gini coefficient or the share 
of income accruing to the poorest 40 per- 
cent. In accordance with this type of judg- 
ment, Fishlow's interpretation of the rising 
Gini coefficient and income share of the 
very richest is the following: "The conclu- 
sion that inequality has increased over the 
course of the decade accordingly seems cor- 
rect, if lamentable" (1972, p. 399). The 
qualitative result -of a "worsening" in- 
come distribution in Brazil---has been 
widely accepted.3'4 
Contrary to the customary interpretation, 
a reexamination of the Brazilian data from 
an absolute income perspective tells a differ- 
ent story. This is the subject of Section II. 
lI. A Reexamination 
A. The Distribution of the 
Benefits of Growth 
The fundamental question underlying the 
analysis of income distribution in economic 
development is this: who (as classified by 
income class or other economic or socio- 
economic criterion) receives what share of 
the proceeds of economic growth? The ideal 
way to answer this question would be to 
follow the same set of individuals over a 
period of time to see how their incomes 
change, and how these changes relate to 
their initial income position and other 
characteristics. The type of longitudinal 
(or panel) data needed to do this do not 
exist for Brazil. In their absence, we must 
rely on frequency distributions of the popu- 
lation by income class. 
To measure changing absolute incomes, 
the numbers presented in Table 1 do not 
quite suffice, because they have different in- 
come brackets in the two years.5 Lacking 
the raw data with which to make an exact 
fit, it is necessary to take the income brack- 
ets for one year as a base and to approxi- 
mate the frequency from the other year in 
each category. The actual distribution for 
1960 and the approximate values for 1970 
are shown in Panel B of Table 2.67 
*2Using slightly different definitions than Fishlow 
and excluding unremunerated workers and the un- 
employed, Langoni found a rise in the Gini co- 
efficient from 0.49 to 0.56, a falling share of national 
income received by each of the four lowest quintiles, 
and a rising share received by the richest 5 percent 
(from 27.9 to 34.9 percent of national income). 
Langoni's exclusion of zero-income persons is pre- 
sumably the reason why his Gini coefficients are lower 
than Fishlow's. For an English-language description 
detailing the characteristics of these and other income 
distribution sources, see Langoni (1975b). 
3See, for instance, the work of Irma Adelman and 
Cynthia Taft Morris, William Cline, and Adolfo 
Figueroa and Richard Weisskoff. 
4The Brazil debate has been conducted largely on 
the basis of the undisputed rise in the Gini coefficient. 
However, it is well known that when Lorenz curves 
cross, as they have been shown to do in Brazil, some 
indices of relative income inequality may indicate a 
more equal distribution of income, while others may 
indicate the reverse. (For an empirical illustration of 
this point for three Latin American countries, see 
Weisskoff.) Possible ambiguities in Brazil were ap- 
parently put to rest by Langoni (1972, p. 15), who 
reported increases in the variance of logarithms and 
the Theil inequality index as well as the Gini co- 
efficient. More recently, though, Samuel Morley and 
Jeffrey Williamson reported that the relative inequal- 
ity measure proposed by A. B. Atkinson yields the 
opposite result. 
5This is also true for other sources of income dis- 
tribution statistics; see Langoni (1975b). 
6The procedure used to approximate the 1970 dis- 
tribution is the following. The mean incomes in 1960 
and 1970 were $513 and $679, respectively, both 
measured in constant 1960 U.S. dollars. These same 
means, expressed in current new cruzeiros (NCr$), 
were 5.52 and 258.1. Thus, the ratio of the real means 
was 1.32, and of the nominal means 46.76. The ratio 
of these, 35.32, is then an inflation factor which can 
be used to deflate the 1970 brackets. For example, the 
first positive income bracket in 1970 runs from 0 to 
2.8 constant NCr$. Then applying a linear approxima- 
tion to the population frequency within each bracket, 
2.1/2.8 of the population in the 0-2.8 category was 
assigned to the 0-2.1 category, and the remaining 
0.7/2.8 was assigned to the next higher category. 
An analogous procedure was followed for the other 
brackets. It would, of course, have been better to have 
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The most striking feature of these data is 
that the cumulative percentage of popula- 
tion was lower in 1970 than in 1960 for 
every income bracket. This means, very 
simply, that the economic growth which 
took place over the decade reached persons 
at all income levels, and not just those at 
the top. 
It should be observed that these figures 
refer to percentage of the population. With 
a growing population, these data imply that 
the Brazilian economy was able to create 
opportunities for its economically active 
population to earn higher incomes at a 
faster rate than its labor force was ex- 
panding. 
These findings clearly refute the notion 
that the rich got absolutely richer while the 
poor got absolutely poorer in Brazil during 
the 1960's. 
B. Income Growth of the Poor and Nonpoor 
The analysis may be extended to compare 
the income growth of the poorest groups 
with that of all others. We may ask four 
related questions: 
1) Defining "the poor" as those whose 
incomes were below a constant real poverty 
line, did the fraction of the economically 
active population classified as poor increase 
or decrease over the decade, i.e., was the in- 
cidence of poverty being reduced? 
2) What were the rates of increase of in- 
come among the poor and nonpoor, i.e., 
were the remaining poor getting less poor, 
absolutely and relatively? 
3) How much of the economic growth 
over the decade went to the poor and how 
much to the nonpoor? 
4) Defining the "poverty gap" as the 
amount by which poor persons' incomes 
would have to be raised to bring them all up 
to the poverty line, how much of the gap 
was filled during the decade? 
We must begin by establishing a poverty 
line. Something like 31 percent of Brazilian 
families were poor in 1960 by Brazilian defi- 
nitions.8 Since it is not possible to identify 
these families exactly, we may suppose that 
those persons in the two lowest income 
brackets (i.e., less than 2.1 NCr$ constant), 
which in 1960 comprised 37.0 percent of the 
population, were below the poverty line. 
From now on, we will refer to these persons 
with incomes below 2.1 as "the poor" and 
the rest of the population as "the nonpoor." 
Considering first the question of chang- 
ing numbers of poor, we see from Panel B 
that there was a small decrease in the per- 
centage of the economically active popula- 
tion with incomes below the poverty line, 
from 37.0 to 35.5 percent. There was not a 
higher incidence of poverty in 1970 than in 
used the exact distribution of the economically active 
population across these income categories rather than 
this approximation; but owing to the lack of a public 
use sample for the microeconomic data, this was im- 
possible. 
One may ask whether the simplified linear interpola- 
tion introduces a bias into Panel B and subsequent 
calculations, and if so how great that bias is. The 
answer is that the income share of those in the 0-2.1 
income class is overstated by my assumptions, but 
under no possible alternative assumptions would any 
of the conclusions reached below, in particular, the 
conclusion about the relative rates of income growth 
among the poor and nonpoor, be reversed qualita- 
tively. Details of these calculations may be found in 
the author (1976). 
7A referee has noted that the data used in this 
paper include zero-income persons. He argues that 
these were previously unpaid farm workers who were 
forced off the land during the 1960's and took up wage 
employment. If this is correct, it raises the possibility 
that the income gains observed in the statistics are 
more apparent than real (due to the receipt of cash 
incomes, which are recorded, rather than incomes-in- 
kind, which were not). To resolve this doubt, he 
suggested excluding the zero-income labor force and 
reestimating income levels at the lower end of the 
distribution. I performed these additional estimates 
and found that the conclusions presented below are 
sustained. The calculations are available upon 
request. 
8The poverty line is defined according to Brazilian 
standards. Says Fishlow; "The real minimum wage 
for 1960 in the Northeast, the poorest region, is taken 
as the lower limit of acceptable income for a family of 
4.3 persons. For rural Brazil, the wage prevailing in 
the rural areas of the Northeast is taken; for the urban 
Northeast, the standard of medium sized municipio is 
applied; and for all other urban residents, the North- 
east level, incremented by 15 percent to allow for 
higher relative prices, is applied. The poverty line for 
different size families is defined with the aid of the 
elasticity of expenditure on food with respect to family 
size; because of economies of scale larger families 
need relatively less income, and conversely for 
smaller" (1972, pp. 393-94). 
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TABLE 2-ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRAZIL AND 
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 1960's 
Importance in the 
Economic Growth of:a 
Brazil U.S. 
Effect Definition of Effect 1960-70 1959-69 
a = Enlargement of the higher income sector 
= Change in the number of persons in the (fn? - - j3_0) 6 19 
high income sector, multiplied by the 
income differential between the high 
income and low income sectors in the 
base year; 
,B = Enrichment of the high income sector 
= Change in income within the high (j-0 -60)f60 82 72 
income sector, multiplied by the number 
of persons in that sector in the base year; 
y = Interaction between enlargement and 
enrichment of the high income sector 
= Change in income within the high (Yn? - j360)(f70 - fn ) 2 8 
income sector, multiplied by the change 
in the number of persons in that sector; 
6 = Enrichment of the low income sector 
= Change in income within the low income (y50 y 7 10 
sector, multiplied by the number of 
persons in that sector in the terminal year; 
a + a = Sum of "poor" enlargement and 
enrichment effect 16 20 
Total 100 100 
Sources: Brazil (see text); U.S.: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1971, Tables 485, 512, 513, 515, 517. 
Notes: fp = fraction of the population which was poor. 
fn = fraction of the population which was nonpoor. 
yp = average income of the poor population. 
Yn = average income of the nonpoor population. 
Brazil United States 
1960 1970 1959 1969 
60 70 59 69 
t 037.00/ f p? 35.500fp 3.%fp 14.90, 
60 70 59 69 
fn=63.0% f n=64.50/ = 76.2% f/ =8.1, 
yTP = NCr$0.8 yP? NCr$1.3 yp = U.S.$2,423 yP9=US$,8 
Yn = NCr$8.3 y= NCr$10.6 Yn = U.S.$10,774 Yn = U.S.$12,343 
aShown in percent. 
1960, as might have been supposed from 
the rising inequality coefficients. Neither, 
though, was the incidence of poverty sub- 
stantially reduced. 
Next, let us compare the rates of growth 
of incomes among the poor as opposed to 
the nonpoor. To determine the average in- 
come in each group in each year, we use the 
basic accounting identity that total income, 
in the economically active population as a 
whole or for the poor and nonpoor sub- 
populations, is equal to the mean income 
multiplied by the number of persons in 
question. Letting yp and Y, be the mean in- 
comes of the poor and nonpoor, respec- 
tively, and P be the population, we have, 
for 1960, 
(1) 37.0%o P y6? + 63.0% p600 60 
P60 (5.52) 
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(2) 37.0% p60jp6O = 5 2% p60(5.52) 
and for 1970, 
(3) 35.5% P70yO70 + 64.5% P70Y70 = 
P70 (258.1/35.32) 
(4) 35.5% p70p70 
8.0% p70 (2.1/2.8) (258.1/35.32) 
Equations (1) and (3) tell us simply that 
total income is equal to the sum of the in- 
comes of the poor and nonpoor. In equa- 
tions (2) and (4), the incomes of the poor 
are expressed first as their mean income 
multiplied by the number poor, and then as 
income in the economically active popula- 
tion multiplied by the income share of the 
poor. The numbers in parentheses are ex- 
plained in footnote 6. 
Solving, we find for the poor: 
(5) y60 = 0.8 j70 = 1.3 
-70 - -60 
p p = 63% 
-600 
p 
and for the nonpoor: 
(6) Y60 = 8.3 A70 = 10.6 
y70 _ 60 
n n 
= 28% y70 
p 
From (5), we see that the poor became 
noticeably less poor; their incomes are esti- 
mated to have grown by 63 percent over the 
decade. Furthermore, comparing (5) and 
(6), the incomes of the poor appear to have 
grown at a rate more than double that of 
the nonpoor.9 This reinforces the earlier ob- 
servation that the rich in Brazil did not 
benefit during the 1960's at the expense of 
the poor. 
Is the 1970 distribution of incomes be- 
tween poor and nonpoor more or less equal 
than the 1960 distribution? The answer de- 
pends on how one defines "equal." If ab- 
solute real income differentials are our 
standard, we observe 
(7) 60 - = 7.5 n0 - Yp = 9.3 
and see that the absolute gap widened by 
about 25 percent. However, this gap was a 
smaller percentage of per capita income in 
1970 than in 1960: 
-60 --60 
n yp 7 __5 (8) =60 - 575 = 1.36 60 5.52 
Y70 - Y70 
_n 9 _ 1.7 
yi 70 258.1/35.32 . 
Furthermore, if we take relative income 
ratios as our standard for comparison, we 
find 
(9) Y6n/y6p = 10.4 -70/-70 = 8.2 
that is, a reduction of the ratio of nonpoor 
to poor incomes of about 20 percent. The 
interpretation of these figures is a matter of 
individual judgment. 
Now let us address the question of how 
much of the economic growth over the 
decade went to the poor and how much to 
the nonpoor. In my 1975 paper, I have de- 
vised a methodology for decomposing total 
economic growth into four effects pertain- 
ing to the enlargement of the various sec- 
tors and the enrichment of persons within 
them. The specific formulas, and the nu- 
merical results for Brazilian economic 
growth during the 1960's, are given in 
Table 2. The outstanding result is that the 
bulk of economic growth in Brazil accrued 
to persons who had been above the poverty 
line in 1960 (,B = 82 percent). Of the total 9The specific figure is open to question for two 
offsetting reasons. On the one hand, income growth 
of the poorest 37.0 percent is understated, since some 
4 percent of the poor (1.5o%/37.0%) received large 
enough income increases to raise them above the pov- 
erty line, and their incomes appear as nonpoor in- 
comes in the above calculations. On the other hand, 
the average income of the poor in 1970 ( 70) tends 
to be overstated, owing to the fact that although the 
poorest of the poor received incomes below the aver- 
age for their income category, they were assigned the 
average value in the approximations of Table I and 
equation (4). Notwithstanding these doubts, it is cer- 
tain that the incomes of the poor grew at least as 
rapidly as those of the nonpoor, since it is mathe- 
matically impossible for the data to be consistent 
with the alternative hypothesis (incomes of the poor 
growing more slowly); see fn. 7. At issue is how much 
greater was the increase for the poor. Although we 
work with the data in Table I in what follows, the 
reader should remember that these are only approxi- 
mate values and not exact figures. 
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NCr $ 
(thousands) 
Poverty 
I inYe = 2;1 A B7 B I9 00 Poverty Gap 
in 1970 
~~p 1.3 D7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6c7O Reduction in Poverty Gap 
between 1960 
y6o~~~~~~~08 ~~~and 1970 
_ _ __ b Percentage of 
35,5% 37.0% population 
Poverty Gap in 1960 AB60 C60 D60 
Poverty Gap in 1970 = AB70 C70 D70 
Reduction in Poverty between 1960 and 1970 
B70 B60 C60 C' + D70 C70 C' D60 E 
FIGURE 1. POVERTY GAP IN BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
growth, only about 16 percent (a + 3) went 
to the poor. Of this, 6 percentage points 
went to elevating formerly poor persons 
above the poverty line (a) while the other 
10 percentage points served to make the 
poor somewhat less poor (6). 
In interpreting this pattern, two consid- 
erations should be borne in mind. For one 
thing, it is not really surprising that most 
of the economic growth of a country would 
be received by the nonpoor. This is partly 
because higher income persons have su- 
perior access to income-earning opportuni- 
ties; partly because many countries develop 
by creating more employment of profes- 
sional and skilled workers, who are likely to 
have been earning above the poverty line to 
begin with; and partly because of the simple 
mathematical fact that the poor cannot re- 
ceive a very large share of the income 
growth before they are no longer poor. In 
addition, if we compare the percentage of 
growth accruing to the poor in Brazil 
(16 percent) with the same figure for the 
United States for the same decade (20 per- 
cent), we find that the results are not very 
different, despite the reputation of the 
United States as a relatively more egalitarian 
society. In future research, it would be most 
interesting to compare a, f, and 6 in a num- 
ber of LDCs and to try to understand simi- 
larities and differences in the observed 
patterns. 
Finally, we may examine the extent to 
which the Brazilian economy closed its 
poverty gap during the 1960's. The poverty 
gap is calculated as the sum of the differ- 
ences between each poor person's (or fam- 
ily's) income and the poverty line. This con- 
cept may be illustrated with the aid of 
Figure 1. Poor persons in 1960, who com- 
prised 37.0 percent of the population (P), 
received an average income of NCr$0.8. 
The poverty gap then was: 
(10) Poverty gap in 1960 
= (Poverty line minus mean income of 
persons below the line in 1960) x (Pop- 
ulation below the poverty line) 
= ($2.1 - $0.8) x 37.0% P 
= $48.1 OP 
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The poverty gap in 1960 is illustrated by the 
area AB60C60D60. Similarly, for 1970, we 
have 
(11) Poverty gap in 1970 
= ($2.1 - $1.3) x 35.50 P 
= $28.4% P 
given by area AB70C70D70. Expressed as a 
percentage of population, the amount of the 
poverty gap made up during the 1960's is 
the sum of two components: that part of the 
increase in incomes which elevated some 
of the poor up to the poverty line 
(B70 B 60 C60 C '), plus the increase in incomes 
of those who remained below the line 
(D70 C70 C' D60). For Brazil between 1960 
and 1970, the amount made-up was: 
(12) Poverty gap made-up 
= (Difference between poverty line and 
mean income of the poor in 1960) x 
(Number of poor elevated above the 
poverty line) 
+ (Change in mean income of the poor 
between 1960 and 1970) x (Number of 
poor remaining poor) 
= [($2.1 - $0.8) x 1.5% P] 
+ [($1.3 - $0.8) x 35.50 P] 
= $19.9,/% P 
The percentage of the poverty gap made-up 
in Brazil over the decade is the ratio of 
(12) to (10) or 41 percent. 
Coincidentally, in the United States (see 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table 517) the 
poverty gap was reduced by exactly the 
same percentage (41 percent) over the same 
period, much of which comprised the "War 
on Poverty" years of the Johnson Adminis- 
tration. Although the percentage reduction 
was the same in the two countries, their 
patterns differed noticeably, as may be seen 
from the following data:'0 
Brazil United States 
1960 -70 1959-69 
Percentage Reduction in 
Poverty Gap 41(/ 41% 
Brazil United States 
1960-70 1959-69 
Percentage Reduction in 
Fraction Poor 5% 33% 
Percentage Reduction in Per- 
centage Difference Between 
Average Income of the Poor 
and the Poverty Line 38% 20% 
Fraction of Poverty Gap Re- 
duction Attributable to 
Smaller Fraction of Popula- 
tion Below the Poverty Line 10% 61% 
We observe that in Brazil, the poverty gap 
reduction took the form of substantially 
raising the incomes of the poor in percent- 
age terms while elevating relatively few 
above the poverty line. In the United States, 
in contrast, the fraction poor was reduced 
by one-third, but those who remained poor 
were helped relatively less by a decade of 
growth than in Brazil. These observations 
support the view that poverty in Brazil in- 
volves individuals potentially in the main- 
stream of the economy (principally low- 
income workers) while poverty in the 
United States is often attributable to lack of 
economic activity (for example, among 
retirees and the physically and mentally 
handicapped). 
C. Summary 
Concerning the changes in income dis- 
tribution in Brazil over the decade of the 
1960's, this section has established the 
following: 
1) The entire income distribution shifted 
in real terms, benefiting every income class. 
2) There was a small decline in the frac- 
tion of the economically active population 
classified as below the poverty line, but 
those who remained poor received markedly 
higher incomes (in proportional terms). 
3) The percentage increase in income for 
those below the poverty line was greater 
than the increase for those not in poverty, 
and may well have been twice as high, or 
more. 
4) The relative income gap between poor 
and nonpoor persons narrowed in terms of 
ratios but widened absolutely. 
5) The bulk of the income growth over 
10Sources: Brazil: computed from Table I in text; 
United States: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Tables 
512, 513, 515, 517. 
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the decade accrued to persons above the 
poverty line. A similar pattern is observed 
for the United States, an allegedly more 
egalitarian society. 
6) The poverty gap in Brazil was reduced 
by 41 percent between 1960 and 1970. The 
United States reduced its poverty gap by 
exactly the same percentage over the same 
decade. 
III. How It Happened 
How was the Brazilian economy able to 
shift its entire income distribution and 
eliminate a considerable percentage of its 
poverty gap during a decade of growth? 
The basic dimensions of change are given in 
Table 3. 
For three-quarters of that country's eco- 
nomically active population, wages were the 
only source of income, and the income re- 
ceived by wage earners was 71 percent of 
the total. It follows, therefore, that the 
changing income distribution has its pri- 
mary origin in a changing labor market. 
Earnings are higher in urban than rural 
areas, and higher in industry than in agri- 
culture. Thus, a shifting income distribu- 
TABLE 3-SOME ASPECTS OF BRAZILIAN LABOR MARKETS IN THE 1960's 
Income Source, 1970a 
Wage earners as percentage of income recipients 740 
Income received by wage earners as percentage of total b 71%,o 
Median Earned Income By Rural-Urban, 1960 (approximate) 
Urban and suburban households Cr$1,250 
Median Earned Income By Economic Sector, 1970 (approximate)C 
Industrial NCr$195 
Agriculture 110 
All sectors 165 
Population (in millions)d 1960 1970 Growth 
Total 70.1 93.2 33% 
Urban 32.5 52.1 60%,0 
Rural 37.6 41.1 9% 
Real Output By Sector, 1949 = 1OOe 
Industrial 261.4 511.8 96/% 
Agriculture 156.1 239.5 530/o 
Total real product f 205.7 368.5 79%0 
Employment By Sector (in millions) 
Industrial 3.0 5.8 770 
Agriculture 12.2 13.1 9/ 
Total economically active population 22.6 29.5 30 % 
Employment By Occupational Type (in thousands)g 1960 1969 
Primary: Agricultural activities, vegetable extrac- 
tion, and fishing 12,271 12,533 2%/ 
Secondary: Mineral extraction, industrial produc- 
tion and services, and construction 2,791 5,476 96%/ 
Tertiary: Professionals, sellers of services 
(including repairmen and domestic workers), 
merchants, transport and communication 
workers, and civil servants (including police 
and army) 5,341 11,082 107%' 
Others not elsewhere classified 2,248 873 
aComisi6n Economica para America Latina (1974), p. 22. 
bBrasil (1960), Table 6. 
CBrasil (1970), Table 8. 
dBrasil (1960), Table I and Brasil (1970), Table 1. 
eFundaQao Getulio Vargas (1973), Table 2. 
fBrasil (1970), Table V. 
Singer (1971), Tables 2.V, 2.VI. 
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tion and reduction of poverty could result 
from the transfer of the population from 
rural agriculture to urban areas in general 
and to the industrial sector in particular. 
That is just what happened. The urban 
population grew nearly twice as fast as the 
total population and more than six times 
faster than the rural population, which can 
only be due to substantial rural-urban 
migration. Rates of growth of output and 
employment in the industrial sector were 
higher than in agriculture. The changing 
sectoral distribution of the labor force is 
reflected as well in the occupational dis- 
tribution, the number of jobs at the lowest 
occupational levels increasing by just 2 
percent over the decade, the number of jobs 
at higher levels doubling. 
What caused labor market conditions to 
change as they did? The answer goes to the 
very heart of the Brazilian economic model. 
The main points of contention concern the 
role of government policy, particularly in 
four areas: industrialization and stabiliza- 
tion, international trade, government wage 
policy, and education. It is well beyond the 
scope of this paper to attempt to pass judg- 
ment on the relative merits of the opposing 
viewpoints. The interested reader is referred 
to Fishlow, Furtado, Brazilian Trends, 
Morley and Williamson, J. P. Wogart, 
Kenneth Mericle, John Wells, and Pedro 
Malan and Wells. How much of the im- 
provement in labor market conditions is 
due to economic growth itself and how 
much to government policy remains an un- 
settled issue. 
IV. Conclusion 
A. Recapitulation 
The conventional wisdom concerning 
Brazilian economic development over the 
1960-70 period may be summarized by 
three propositions: 
1) The absolute rate of growth was high, 
particularly in the latter part of the period. 
2) Income distribution worsened. 
3) Significant social and political costs 
were paid. 
Many economists and other social sci- 
entists have invoked judgments on points 
2) and 3) in questioning whether the higher 
rate of economic growth was "worth it." 
Evidence on the first two points is presented 
in Section I above. 
Accepting the rapidity of aggregate 
growth over the decade, I have in this paper 
reexamined the challenge concerning the 
income distributional consequences of 
Brazilian growth. The main innovation is 
the use of absolute poverty measures in 
place of the usual relative inequality in- 
dices. Changes over the decade in absolute 
economic position of the poor and nonpoor 
populations were presented in Section II. 
The findings based on the absolute 
poverty approach cast considerable doubt 
on the conventional wisdom. At minimum, 
the widely held notion that "the rich got 
rich at the expense of the poor" receives no 
support in the data examined here. To the 
contrary, the poor in Brazil clearly did share 
in a decade of economic development. 
Some poor were lifted out of poverty. For 
those left behind, their incomes grew at 
least as rapidly as those of the nonpoor. At 
the same time, the very rich also got richer 
than before, in both absolute and relative 
terms. Relative inequality did become 
greater by most measures. 
Section III then described how changes 
in the structure of production and employ- 
ment in the Brazilian economy shifted over 
the decade in favor of the relatively ad- 
vanced and high-paying sectors: urban 
areas, the industrial sector, and relatively 
high-level occupations. These factors pre- 
sumably account for a considerable part of 
the observed income distribution changes. 
B. Issues in Interpreting the 
Brazilian Experience 
In appraising the performance of the 
Brazilian economy over the 1960's, some 
important questions are raised by these 
findings: 
1) How much weight do we want to give in 
our evaluations to changes at which points on 
the income distribution? 
I have chosen in this paper to concentrate 
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on the number of very poor in Brazil and 
on the levels of income they receive. Such a 
focus has been urged by many writers, in- 
cluding Fishlow and Langoni themselves."' 
Nonetheless, the measures they use focus 
either on the entire income distribution or 
on the very top. In particular, it is well 
known (see, for example, David Cham- 
pernowne) that the Gini coefficient assigns 
the greatest weight to changes in the 
middle of the income distribution and is rel- 
atively insensitive to income changes at 
either end. There thus appears to be a dis- 
crepancy between the welfare weights im- 
plicit in the measures used by previous 
writers on Brazil and the judgments they 
themselves wish to make about the primacy 
of income changes among the very poor. 
2) Are the incomes of the poor in Brazil 
being raisedfast enough? 
An increase in average incomes of the 
poor of as much as 60 percent in a decade 
works out to an average annual rate of 
about 4 percent, starting from a very low 
level. I am unaware of evidence from other 
less developed countries that might indicate 
whether this rate is comparatively high or 
low. In any event, taking Brazil on its own, 
with a continuing growth rate of 5 percent 
per annum, 20 to 30 years would be needed 
to raise the poorest decile up to $100 per 
capita income, given the present pattern of 
income inequality. Writes Fishlow: "Can 
the present starving poor be expected to 
wait for 30 years, amid rising affluence, to 
attain the princely sum of $100 per capita? 
That, stripped of its niceties, is what the 
debate is all about" (1973, p. 90). Whether 
the growth experience of Brazil should be 
commended or condemned may well hinge 
on the answer to this question. 
3) Was the economic growth of the latter 
1960's and early 1970's worth the apparent 
social and political costs? 
Very few studies of economic develop- 
ment have considered the noneconomic 
costs of growth. Yet, in the case of Brazil, 
this issue can hardly be avoided. In present- 
ing these results on the distributional ques- 
tion, I have not taken a position in favor of 
the social measures adopted in Brazil, nor 
would I wish to. Conventional welfare eco- 
nomics offers no real guidance on how to 
weigh the measures used to achieve eco- 
nomic growth against the actual develop- 
ment realized, and we are left to rely on 
personal judgments concerning matters of 
social justice. Personally, I doubt that in 
the Brazilian case the ends justify the 
means, but this is a value judgment, not a 
scientific conclusion, and others will un- 
doubtedly disagree. 
C. How to Determine Who Benefits 
from Economic Development 
Beyond these specific questions pertain- 
ing to the particular case of Brazil, this 
study raises a much more fundamental issue 
of general applicability, namely, how 
should distributional concerns be brought to 
bear in evaluating a country's economic de- 
velopment? In my 1975 paper, I showed that 
when a country's high income sector en- 
larges to absorb an increasing share of the 
population, the more rapid alleviation of 
poverty is invariably accompanied by 
greater measured inequality in the early 
stages. When growth takes place in this 
fashion, should rising inequality be in- 
terpreted as an economically meaningful 
"worsening" of the income distribution or 
as an emotively neutral statistical artifact 
inherent in the very nature of this class of 
relative inequality indices? I would tend to 
opt for the latter. In any case, the key point 
is that there is no necessary concurrence 
between absolute-income and relative- 
inequality based distributional studies. 
What this all basically comes down to is 
whether we wish to give greater weight in 
our judgments about the distributional con- 
sequences of economic development to the 
alleviation of absolute poverty or to the 
narrowing of relative income inequality. 
Personally, I am most concerned about the 
alleviation of absolute poverty among the 
i 1The desirability of a poverty focus has been stated 
clearly by Fishlow (1972, pp. 392-95) and Langoni 
(1972, pp. 80-81). For similar statements outside the 
Brazilian context, see, for instance, Robert McNamara 
in Hollis Chenery et al., and Dudley Seers. 
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very poorest, and have made use of mea- 
sures with this explicit focus to the virtual 
exclusion of the rest of the income distribu- 
tion. Others with different value judgments 
who may be more concerned than I with 
relative income comparisons or with the 
middle or upper end of the income distribu- 
tion may wish to give relatively greater 
weight to changes in other measures in ar- 
riving at their own interpretations of the 
Brazilian experience. 
Ideally, the choice of the measure to use 
and the specific welfare weights assigned 
should reflect the value judgments we wish 
to make. Despite recent advances in this 
area, there is not yet any consensus on 
how best to go about bringing these judg- 
ments to bear in practice. This is perhaps 
one of the most important lessons emerging 
from the Brazil debate. 
This reexamination of the Brazilian ex- 
perience has raised some fundamental ques- 
tions. Did the personal distribution of in- 
come really worsen in Brazil over the 
1960's? Should the rising Gini coefficient 
weigh negatively in our welfare judgments, 
and if so, by how much? How much im- 
portance should be given to considerations 
of relative incomes as opposed to absolute 
poverty? By assigning heavy weight to 
changes in the usual indices of relative in- 
come inequality and interpreting these in- 
creases as offsets to the well-being brought 
about by growth, the participants in the 
Brazilian debate and others who have fol- 
lowed similar approaches in studies of 
other less developed countries appear to 
have overlooked important tendencies to- 
ward the alleviation of poverty. 
12Among the recent works are Atkinson, Nicholas 
Stern, Montek Ahluwalia and Hollis Chenery, and the 
author and John Fei. 
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